Tony SigBe it the gripping Torture and Eucharist, the insightful Mystical Theology or the symphonic On Christian Theology, books in the Blackwell series “Challenges in Contemporary Theology” have yet to not drastically shift my worldview after reading, and Graham Ward’s Christ and Culture is no exception (I can’t wait to read the rest in the series).

Despite the fact that this is a collection of previously released and delivered essays, there is a certain deep similarity in theme, style and content between them.  These pick up on all the collective themes of Christology; “incarnation, atonement, the economics of the Trinity what it is to be human [and] the Church” (23) but do so in a manner steeped in discourses very distant to the sort of christology of predication that I’m used to reading such as hermeneutics, metaphysics and cultural theory. Topics like embodiment and the operation of desire also play a large role. (23)

Yet all revolve around very close readings of Scripture.  Ward pays particular attention to St. Mark’s Gospel but Scripture is used thoroughly and uniquely all throughout this book.  Even if one were to disagree with all of Ward’s conclusions, many of which are controversial, this book is hugely important as I see it for its christological and exegetical method(s).

Ward builds off Aquinas where in the Summa he says, “God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us in His operations. (Summa Theologiae, I.Q13.8).  Therefore Ward asks not “who is the Christ or what is the Christ [but] where is the Christ” (1) … and I might add, “what is Christ doing?”

The introduction alone is worth the price which not only concisely lays out his own vision but offers a substantive and wide ranging critique of Karl Barth, especially his christological dialectics which as Ward sees it, makes of Christ “either the absolute subject or the absolute object.” (12) (This seems not too unlike to some of Rowan Williams’ critique of Barth, cf. – “Barth on the Triune God,” Wrestling With Angels, pp.106-149) Briefly summing it up, Ward lays it out like this:

“Barth’s dogmatic approach to Christology (a) all too thinly defines the economies of salvation in which the gracious love of Christ finds a responding desire; (b) this finds expression in the thinness of his account of mediations (c) such that his mediating christology remains tied to specific cultural assumptions about the subject and nature; (d) this binds christology to the logic of dualism, itself a product of a certain cultural heritage in modernity; (e) this logic and these assumptions, on the basis of which we develops his dialectical method, render him unable to reflect upon his own cultural production of christology.  The world is so lost, so secularized, so ignorant of God that both Christ and subsequently a theology of Christ operate above and beyond such a world, in contradistinction to it.” (14-15)

Of the Ward books I’ve read, this and his Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice were the ones that really captured my imagination.  It is important in its own right (or seems like it to me at least) but also in that it renders such criticisms as “RO doesn’t deal with Christ or the Bible or discipleship seriously enough” in need of more evidence.  And it also disrupts the all too common saying I hear, that Ward is some sort of exception to RO, “Ward I can take, Milbank I can’t.”  Nevertheless, Ward would not want to be holed up on a “side” in contemporary theology.

I can’t wait to reread this one…hopefully I’ll make more strides toward comprehending the details.

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When I was 21, I was crazy about a girl who was moving to England. It was silly to hope, but I couldn’t help it. In the weeks before she left, we spent a lot of time together. It became obvious that she was feeling the same as me yet neither of us could admit it. How could a relationship work over such a long distance?
 
Sure enough, three weeks after she’d settled into her London flat, it all came gushing out. We were separated by thousands of miles—yet in finally releasing those emotions—we felt closer than ever before. Our interactions took place mostly over the phone or email and we were thrilled when she got a new computer because we could use video chat to be even closer. For a while, romance overcame our separation.
 
But eventually, I came to realize that nothing could ever quite cover that distance. It didn’t matter if it was her voice over the phone, little notes in my inbox or even her smiling face on the monitor—she was never really, truly there. We could talk for hours but it wouldn’t satisfy. I wanted to take her to coffee, to surprise her at work, to smell her hair, to touch her hand—in short, I desired her presence, not just her attention.
 
It was this notion of presence that was at stake during the Christological controversies of the 4th century. Arius had pushed God to such an insurmountable distance, that the presence of God in the Incarnation could not be possible. Sure, Christ was a special being, but he was still just a creation—like anyone else. Thus for Arius, God existed at a distance and the cross was little more than an elaborate video chat.
 
Nicaea rejected this notion of skype Jesus. For Athanasius, no creature—not even the first creature—could redeem our sin and reconcile this world to its Creator. God’s presence within creation as well as without speaks to our being both body and spirit. The world is good. God dwells in it. But it needs to be renewed. The incarnation makes God’s immanence and transcendence concievable.
 
Surely the incarnation as fully God and fully human is a matter of relationship. But this relationship extends beyond God-Human into the very center of God’s being. It is in God’s very nature to yearn for another and thus one who loves requires also a beloved.
 
I was crazy about her, but my beloved in London and I eventually broke up—though not until after she’d moved back home. This wasn’t because we lacked chemistry or desire for one another but because we were two separate people who realized our very different lives could not be joined together.
 
But in the Trinity, such a separation is impossible. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are one in substance, meaning their wills cannot conflict nor can there ever really be a reliable dividing line between the three persons of the one God.
 
Now, God is not your boyfriend and romance is certainly not the only way to picture this unity. The goal of this post is not to encompass the variety of ways we speak of God as three in one but to center our dialogue on the idea of relationship. The Trinity is not a distant, hazy philosophical concept but an approachable, devotional and necessary reflection. The discussion is not complete and we are not meant to arbitrarily believe it. Rather, it is an ongoing conversation that will inevitably leak into our lives as grace, church and mission.

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Frankly, I’m a little skeptical of posting this last entry on Islam.  I’m not even sure why, really.  It’s long, it’s probably out of the range of interests for a lot of our readers, and some of our readers seem to be annoyed at my recent foray into Islamic studies.  Nonetheless, I think Christians must strive to better understand Islam (I am, at this point, at least echoing the feelings of other theophilicas: see this post, #4).

So, here is the discussion I want to have about this piece of research: Do you think mysticism is a common enough thread to open dialogue between religions?  I am under the impression that most (all?) religions have their own mystics, so what about the human condition and pursuit for experiential knowledge of the divine drives mystics?  I, again, cannot get over how many similarities exist between the development of Islamic orthodoxy and Christianity (no matter how loudly critics shout about the differences that do exist, and I do acknowledge that those differences exist).

Introduction

            Mysticism, as a philosophy, contends that knowledge about reality exists beyond sense perception.  Within the context of religious experience, the object of that knowledge finds its locus in the personal experience of the divine and its execution of the prescribed ritual behavior of the sect in question.[1]  Mysticism within monotheistic traditions like Christianity and Islam incorporate various disciplines in order to achieve an experiential knowledge of God so intimate that it may be referred to as a union with God.[2]  Ultimately, mysticism seeks to use this union to bridge the gap that exists between the believers’ temporal expression of faith and the metaphysical reality of God’s direct presence.  As such, mystical traditions initially give the impression of correcting the inclination to focus exclusively on the manual, orthodox expressions of faith exhibited by those religious sects that adhere to monotheistic creeds.

            The creed, then, is irrevocably central to the faith of Islam, and Islam’s understanding of the creed is ubiquitous in its assertion that Allah is, by ontological necessity, a distant God.  The resulting religious institution demonstrates a long history of stringent adherence to protocol.  George W. Braswell affirms that, “Islam is a religion of law, ritual, and duty.”[3]  It should come as no surprise, then, that Islam has often been assailed by the tyranny of orthodox legalism and ritualism.  Sufism emerged naturally as an internal response to the emotional and spiritual disconnect bred by such developments.  It attempted to surmount the distance felt by Muslims by accentuating the nearness of God as a concept taught in both the Qur’ān and Ḥadith through the demonstration of the love, closeness, and presence of God.[4] 

            Like many ascetic movements, though, nearness to God in Sufism is best accomplished and then demonstrated through denial of worldly excess and personal discipline in matters of piety.  The term Sufism, which has become the nomenclature associated with Islamic mysticism, is etymologically derived from an Arabic verbal noun which means “the habit of wearing woolen garments.”[5]  Muslims commonly hold that the term “Sufism” harkens back to those original mystic believers whose only common element was a renouncement of the superficial outward observance of religious law endemic to the corrupt rulers in favor of a spiritual piety that clothed itself modestly in “wool.”  Accordingly, theological rigidity was also traded for supernatural experience and esoteric knowledge.

            However, the orthodox Islamic understanding of God’s transcendence, something of which Sufism has learned to stay well within, limits the mysticism of Sufis to a kind of gnostic experience.  Thus, early Sufism was also influenced by Christian Gnosticism.  Within that influence, a preference for allegory, symbolism and metaphor feeds the Sufi experience of esoteric knowledge.  Nevertheless, interestingly, elements of Islamic mysticism have existed within most Muslim sects, and in many cases create an avenue for divisive groups to reintegrate with orthodoxy.  The interplay that occurs between the theological knowledge of orthodoxy and the gnosis of mysticism creates a system of accountability between the legal and practical communities within Islam.  Sufism seems to vacillate between reconciling both strict legalistic movements and radical secessionist groups to orthodox readings of the Qur’ān, especially those readings whose content share important motifs (e.g. using “light” as a metaphor for God) with other mystic traditions.  This paper attempts to enumerate those ways in which Sufism has proven to be a reconciliatory movement within the greater Islamic community.

Development and Historical Theology of Sufism

            The earliest attempts at mysticism within Islam likely occurred during the last decades of the eighth century C.E.  Like the eastern Christian monasticism and asceticism that informed it, Islamic mysticism, in its seminal stages, was a reaction of the pious against those who held positions of power and influence within the ruling classes.[6]  They remain incomprehensible to scholars, though, because of poor documentation and an utter lack of homogeneity among the respective groups.[7]  However, the common thread that surfaced in each of the early mystical groups was a pious renunciation of the excessive living and shallow spirituality of the rulers.  Some renunciants were prominent figures, scholars, and famous preachers like Ibrāhīm ibn Adham al-Balkhī (778 CE), Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (728 CE), ‘Abd al-Wāḥid ibn Zayd (767 CE), Fuḍayl ibn ‘Iyāḍ (803 CE), and Bishr ibn al-Ḥārith al-Ḥāfī (841 CE).  All of them, though, were known to have worn wool.[8]  Ultimately, their heart of renunciation, their penchant for ascetic accoutrement, and their tendency to gather under the leadership of spiritual masters would earn them their sobriquet.  The resulting development of Sufism as a movement seems to owe itself to the impetus of at least two factors: political corruption and theological dogmatism.[9]

            In the early centuries of Islam, Muslim armies bent on conquest enjoyed immense success; and a rift spread between rulers that grew drunk on power and wealth and pious scholars that proved impotent in the wake.  This disparity left Muslims struggling with how to respond to the abuse of power perpetrated by their rulers.  They had opportunity to go along with the interpretation of Islam offered by their rulers and build wealth or to follow the lead of those ascetics who would reject the spoils of the world in favor of spiritual wealth.[10]  Such passive attempts to subvert the oppressive Umayyad regime went largely unnoticed, because of the more activist antics of groups like the Khārijīs and Shī ᷾īs.[11]  Ironically, the regime that drove its conscientious objectors to asceticism because of abuse of power allowed the same to flourish under its own watch as it fought to subjugate the other, more vocal insurrectionists.  As the Umayyad rulers sought to control the threat of insurgents, the Sufi quietly worked to disrupt that rule by demonstrating the benefits of a life dedicated toward the experience of God through personal piety.

             All of the political clashes and internal unrest inevitably lead to a standoff between Islamic scholars over which faction had the right to impose correct interpretation and practice on the general population.  A bitter conflict over orthodoxy that further divided Muslims also arose.  These conflicts lead to an atrophied spirituality and cold dogmatism within Islam.  As a result, Muslims that were weary with the quibbling of their leaders began to pursue experiences with God, not disputes about him.  Sufism was subsequently energized by this pursuit and the belief that if Muhammad could have revelations from Allah, so could others.[12]  According to Ahmet Karamustafa this transition resulted in, “new discourses on spiritual states, stages of spiritual development, closeness to God, and love; it also led to a clear emphasis on ‘knowledge of the interior’ (‘ilm al-bāṭin) acquired through ardent examination and training of the human soul.”[13]  In their own perception, this exaltation of a longing for closeness to and love for God, “justified the austerities to which they subjected themselves in order to demonstrate their faithfulness.”[14]  Thus, the Sufi were also able to rationalize driving the wedge between themselves and the legalists even deeper by rejecting the pedantic proclamations regarding righteous living within the intent of the State handed down by warring caliphs and imams.

            While the origin of the Sufi movement proves to be rooted in reaction against negative forces within Islam, its proliferation appears to be the consequence of a renewed understanding of the spirit of orthodoxy.  The renewed emphasis and nurture of the inner life was, “concomitant with a similar inward reorientation among the same circles of renunciants in the attempt to achieve a true understanding of the divine revelation.”[15]  Sufism had infused its adherents, not only with a desire to know God and the self truly, but also to know them through accurate, energetic study of the Qur’ān.  As such, the return to the inner self and the desire for esoteric knowledge necessitated a reciprocal return to Islamic orthodoxy within the Sufi communities.  Therefore, the emergence of a Sufi theology served to further galvanize the mystics, to expand the scope and diversity of Sufi influence, and eventually to provide a philosophical counterbalance for Muslim faith and practice that extended to every stratum of society.[16]

            Perhaps most important to the study of Sufi theology, and subsequently to the notion of Sufism as a reconciliatory force, is the understanding that “Sufism did not isolate itself from the wider Muslim society and discourse.”[17]  Instead, Sufism proved to be a plausible branch of Islamic learning, demonstrating that it is a legitimate ‘ilm (knowledge/discipline) within the orthodox community.[18]  However, Sufi theorists strive to establish an important distinction between the ‘ilm within Islam and the ma‘rifa (gnosis or cognitio experimentalis) of Sufism.[19]  Renard cites that several Islamic scholars, like Kalābādhī, Makkī, Qushayrī, Anṣari, and Ibn al-‘Arīf, “locate experiential knowledge within their treatments of spiritual development, but do not make knowledge function as a structural basis for their overall approaches to the spiritual life.”[20]  Sufi theology, then, clearly includes the didactic, cognitive elements which place it firmly within the testable arena of orthodoxy as well as the experiential, esoteric knowing of self and God affiliated with mystic experience.  What emerges from such a construct within Islamic theology is a group of mystic scholars hailed as exemplary figures within both traditional and Sufi camps.

            Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī is one important figure of such towering respect from the eleventh century C.E.  Ghazālī is a Sufi scholar whose prestigious career was dedicated almost singularly to the pursuit of knowledge (ma‘rifa).  According to Renard, “From the start Ghazālī makes it very clear that becoming a person of knowledge is a foundational religious calling, one that outranks even devotion and martyrdom.”[21]  Interestingly, one of the primary theological notions put forth by Ghazālī, the “divinely instilled human pre-disposition (isti‘dād) to ma‘rifa of God,” constitutes a theology of the heart wherein knowledge of God comes only from knowledge of self.[22]  A believer must, then, be able to recognize and submit to God’s grace, which enables a person to know God, before they are even able to understand themselves which itself is a prerequisite to experiencing the divine presence. 

            Abrahamov explains that while this metaphysical claim asserts orthodox requirements regarding God’s transcendence and sovereignty, “it is not one of passivity,” in fact, “Man should not wait for God’s assistance, but work and be active for the purpose of knowing the world and its phenomena which is the requisite for knowing God and hence loving Him.”[23]  Indeed, Ghazālī teaches that the experiential knowledge of God comes only through the thorough analysis of all the conditions of the heart, and that knowledge only comes by strict adherence not only to the disciplines of Sufism, but also adherence to the Pillars of Faith expressed in Islam.[24]  Abrahamov agrees that while Ghazālī’s postulations certainly fall to the philosophical, they are clearly Islamic as well.[25]  This clear observance of orthodoxy allows Sufism to direct Muslims in the pursuit of God’s presence without violating the sanctity of His transcendence, and readily allows the movement to adapt to the demands of the sectarian and cultural manifestations of Islam.  Sufism provides for mystical, experiential knowledge of God to be a natural extension of Islamic piety, and provides the necessary impetus for many groups to align themselves with orthodoxy.

Sufism as Reconciliatory Sect

            Perhaps the greatest testimony to the reconciliatory nature of Sufism is the response that kalām thinkers have had to it.  Winter observes that while kalām should not be seen as coterminous with “theology” within Islamic studies, import should be rendered to those Muslim scholars from the kalām tradition that show “increasing respect for Sufi approaches to knowledge,” a group that has even come to recognize the “centrality of Sufism in constructions of Muslim ‘orthodoxy.’”[26]  Toby Mayer explains why Sufism was able to integrate itself into orthodox thinking thusly:

But Sufism did not isolate itself from wider Muslim society and discourse.  On the contrary, it underwent an extremely productive tension which was arguably the central dynamic of Islamic intellectual history: though Sufism constituted an esoterism of the highest order, with all the exclusiveness which that implies, it also had to reckon with the Islamic genius.  The salient quality of that genius is integrality.  In this there is a subtle but definite link between the unity of God and that of man, theological tawhīd (“making one” – monotheism) implying societal tawhīd.[27]

 Thus, tawhīd is not only the theological impetus behind Sufism, but it remains one of the foundational theological elements by which Muslims demonstrate harmony under the revelation of God’s will[28] and successfully submit to the will of God in matters of personal piety.  Consequently, Sufi scholars, like al-Ghazālī, have been able to demonstrate successfully that Sufism exists at the core of Islam, and that it “could not divorce itself from Islamic society, despite constituting at times a radically esoteric movement.”[29]

            The tension mentioned by Mayer bears repeating, because the development of Sufism demonstrates that a simple devotional adherence to experiencing God, even in an esoteric sense, drove the amalgamation that occurred early in the movement’s history.  This reconciliatory nature, then, is not some modern derivation of the Sufi tradition, it is the Sufi tradition.  The Sufi practice of systematic self-examination as spiritual devotion, in particular, seems to be just as ubiquitous in the history of Islam as its theological ties to the tawhīd, especially within the classical theological schools.  Proto-Sufism exhibited within the doctrine of the Muʹtazilite movement was evidenced by the presence of Sufi followers at the school of Abū Sahl Bishr ibn al-Muʹtamir, and seemed to be an early verification of orthodoxy in spite of the school’s speculative nature.[30]  Ironically, Sufism’s influence is also seen in the schools of Bakriyya and Sālimiyya (kalām), institutions set at odds with the rationalism of Muʹtazila and still able to integrate with Sufism.[31]  Mayer also points out that one other major school, the Karrāmiyya, was “counter-Muʹtazilite,” but constructed a defense of orthodoxy and revised contemporary theological jargon based on the methods of mystic introspection.[32]

            Finally, though not exhaustively, the influence of al-Ghazālī by the eleventh century is of paramount importance in the eventual synthesis of Ashʹarism and Sufism.  Sufism has in Ghazālī the perfect esoteric argument from a renowned exoteric scholar.  In fact, Mayer points out that even Ghazālī’s conversion to Sufism was in effect a “bold attempt” to revive exoteric sciences through Sufism.[33]  Ashʹari’s school was a major kalām force that succeeded under Ghazālī’s patrons, and eventually produced the official theology (which emphasized the tawhīd) of the Seljuk domains.[34]  Subsequently, Sufism enjoyed greater synthesis into the Islamic ethos, and eventually became one of the elements of Islamic theology and philosophy that tied most Muslims together.  According to Mayer, “Philosophy and Sufism thus influenced each other theologically.  Sufism’s impact on philosophy is yet more obvious later in its history, in the Safavid period.  Its influence pervades the thoughts of the most eminent Safavid Shīʹite philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā.”[35]  Thus, Sufism and its emphasis on the internal state of humanity not only informed, but reconciled dissenting factions through Islamic history.

Conclusion

            There are numerous ways in which Sufism has proven to be a reconciliatory movement within the greater Islamic community throughout history.  Primarily, though, Sufism has proven to be a logical component of the greater orthodox canon in Islamic theology.  Initially, proto-Sufi groups inspired the introspective discipline that would later become a natural extension of the doctrine of tawhīd with their ascetic commitment to Islamic ideals.  The philosophical understanding of how the Qur’ān intends the unity of God and his creation to be understood and demonstrated allows for exegetical flexibility.  Once Sufism was able to establish such a strong philosophical connection to such an important doctrinal element of Islam, the Sufi path to knowledge was embraced by many sects throughout Muslim history.  Consequently, the esoteric goal of Sufism blended well with the Islamic commission to demonstrate and propagate the unity of God with his creation.  As such, Sufism continues to prove an able reconciliatory force among orthodox Islamic factions that cannot deny the call of the Qur’ān to proclaim the message of Allah through the prophet Muhammad to all of mankind.


[1] Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 593.

[2] Walter A. Elwell, ed., Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 806.

[3] George W. Braswell, Islam: Its Prophet, Peoples, Politics and Power, (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1996), 97.

 [4] Ibid., 75.

[5] Alexander Knysh, Islamic Mysticism: A Short History, Themes in Islamic Studies 1, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 5.

[6] Keith E. Swartley, ed., Encountering the World of Islam, (Atlanta: Authentic Media, 2005), 216.

[7] Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 1.

[8] Ibid., 2.

[9] See Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 9; Swartley, ed., Encountering, 216.

[10] Swartley, ed., Encountering the World, 216.

[11] Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 9.

[12] Swartley, ed., Encountering the World, 216.

[13] Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period, 2.

[14] Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 9.

[15] Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period, 2; A point corroborated by Ernst on multiple occasions.  Carl W. Ernst, The Shambhala Guide to Sufism, (Boston: Shambhala, 1997), 25-26; 81.

[16] Ernst, The Shambhala guide, 31, 120; Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative Period, 134; Knysh, Islamic Mysticism, 170.

[17] Tim Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, Cambridge Companions to Religion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 259.

[18] John Renard, trans., Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, The Classics of Western Spirituality, (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 19.

[19] Renard classifies ‘ilm as “ordinary, traditional, discursive, acquired or ‘scientific’ knowledge” and ma‘rifa as “more intimate, infused, experiential or ‘mystical’ knowing.”  See Renard, Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism, 19.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 46.

[22] Ibid., 48.

[23] Binyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism: The Teachings of al-Ghazâlî and al-Dabbâgh, (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 84.

[24] Renard, Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism, 49-50.

[25] Abrahamov, Divine Love, 85-86.

[26] Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 2.

[27] Ibid., 259.

[28] Swartley, ed., Encountering the World, 135.

[29] Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 259.

[30] See Braswell, Islam, 96; Michael A. Sells, ed., trans., Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qur’an, Mi’raj, Poetic and Theological Writings, The Classics of Western Spirituality, (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 308-310; Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 260.

[31] Sells, ed., trans., Early Islamic Mysticism, 226; Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 262-263.

[32] Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 264.

[33] Ibid., 270.

[34] Sells, ed., trans., Early Islamic Mysticism, 318-320; Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 270-271.

[35] Winter, ed., The Cambridge Companion, 280.

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This is an appraisal of a document by K. Dayton Hartman II over at “Answering Islam.”  The notion of “differentiated unity,” and the assessment of the issue of Christian Trinitarianism within the Muslim worldview belong to him.  I have just offered my synthesis here.  {Author’s note: The conclusions I draw from Hartman’s article are different than his conclusions, please take the time to go over to “Answering Islam” and read the article.}

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              The centerpiece of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religion is their shared adherence to monotheism.  While the Jewish and Islamic faiths adhere to a “pure” monotheism, Christianity expresses its monotheism in the doctrine of the Trinity.[1]  Additionally, while the differences between Christianity and Islam may be varied, a good deal of the impasse existing between Christian and Islamic relationships exists over the Christian expression of the Trinity and its doctrinal progeny.[2]  Indeed, within orthodox Christianity, much of the doctrinal formation around Christ has been articulated through the Trinitarian formula.  Consequently, demonstrating how the doctrine of the Trinity maintains the tawhid of God within Islam will become an important element to bridging the gap between the two.  Some feel that answering the Muslim ideal of undifferentiated unity within the Trinity is a necessary first step.

              This type of undifferentiated unity, within observable reality, is the kind that we have come to expect from a rock.  If you break a rock into pieces, you are left with several rocks that exist individually in every aspect as they did when they were one larger rock.  The individual essence of a rock doesn’t change when the rock is broken.  This very rudimentary example analogizes the reasoning behind Islamic contentions that Christians worship three gods.  If you divide the person of God, then what you have is three gods not one.   The tawhid of God demands that he is, in ontological reality, a unity.  However, there are myriad other examples within biological existence that demonstrate the plausibility of a differentiated unity.   The human being for instance begins as an undifferentiated unity (in the embryonic state) that develops into a differentiated unity (in the fetal state and beyond).  Were a human being to be cut into two pieces, no one would claim that two humans existed where previously there was only one (unless the embryo splits, then we have twins, etc – hence the distinction between differentiated and undifferentiated unity).  Therefore, it is logically viable to assert that each member of the body serves a different purpose, yet they come together to form the unified existence of a human being.

              Admittedly, the Islamic notion of God and his transcendence may seem an obstacle for using the created order to explain the nature of God.  However, the Qur’an itself uses anthropomorphisms to shape the essence of God’s attributes and actions (Qur’an 38:71-72, 75; 49:1; 55:27; et al).  The problem of knowledge by way of analogy still exists, though.  Simile and metaphor are useful in communicating the unknown by some known means.  The extent to which the Islamic community will accept the use of analogy to describe the ontological reality of God, even within its demonstrated use in the Qur’an, is debatable.  However, the fact remains that Allah sought to demonstrate himself through what the prophet Muhammad wrote, and an out of hand rejection of understanding the nature of God through his creation would also damage the Islamic adherence to the notion that we can know God at all.  Unfortunately, it leaves this element of the debate firmly within the untenable sphere of degrees.[3]

              The argument for a differentiated unity is not completely worn out, however.  Islamic theology expresses an important eternal relationship between Allah and the Qur’an that demonstrates that the potential for such a notion is already present.  Specifically, the Qur’an self declares that it exists eternally alongside and in essence with God, but distinct from God in written form (Qur’an 85:21-22; 43:4; 4:164; 7:143; 2:253; 42:51).  Thus, perhaps an oversimplification here, the Qur’an is the literal word of God, and, as such, it shares (again, according to the Qur’an) the essence of who God is – including eternality, though it is present with humanity.  Those who understand the Trinitarian theology will immediately wonder what philosophical difference really exists between such an understanding of the relationship between Allah and the Qur’an and an orthodox understanding of the members of the Holy Trinity.  Hartman duly notes, “Undeniably, if the Qur’an is eternal, as the attribute of Allah’s speech, and yet exists distinctly in the ‘preserved tablet,’ this is analogous to the Christian conception of Trinity.”

              How, then, can Christianity and Islam begin reconciling their differences?  There is most certainly an element of stubborn adherence to vocabulary coming from both sides.  The term Trinity has come to be synonymous with polytheism within most Islamic circles, but it is a term that will never be relinquished by Christians.  The conversations, therefore, seemed to be forever doomed to beginning with a careful and diplomatic parsing of theological jargon.  The extent to which the average Christian and Muslim leader or layperson is equipped to enter into such philological sparring is debatable – and disappointing.

 

 


[1] Before any of you start in on me about how Trinitarian theology constitutes real or “pure” monotheism; allow me to say that I mean Christians, of the three (Islam, Judaism, Christianity), are the only group that puts qualification on God’s existence as a “differentiated unity,” whereas the other two do not.

[2] I am here thinking of all the Christological doctrines that come out of the Christian notion that Jesus is divine: the incarnation, the sinless life, the atoning sacrifice, et al.

[3] Some may accept this premise, but only “to the degree” that the human mind requires things like anthropomorphisms to accurately understand God’s transcendence.  That, presumably, would be the exact extent to which the Qur’an utilizes such methodology.  How one could begin to justify such a claim is currently beyond me, however.

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