I Hate End Notes – The End

September 30, 2011

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Publishers have defiled the work of at least two of my favorite authors, and I am sure there are more to come.  What is the dubious nature of these putrescent literary obscenities?  End Notes.  There is a disturbing trend in which even books that are geared toward educated readers are being published without footnotes.  This is unacceptable and I demand that all such activity cease and desist immediately.  I present two comparisons to make my case, N.T. Wright and Miroslav Volf.  I do understand that their careers and ministries resemble the body of work produced by bands like Aerosmith or Metallica.  In Rock n’ Roll and Metal terms, they were purists, pounding audiences with unadulterated music – archetypes of a genre - then, as they became more popular, their music had to become more accessible to the tastes of the consumerist masses.  They turned out music that had the obvious gloss of marketing and brand recognition.  Music producers and agents did to their music what publishers are doing to the likes of Wright and Volf. 

In fairness, the analogy fails on some points, I know.  Wright and Volf have a pastoral duty to make the kinds of important things they say to Christendom accessible to all of the Church.  I just don’t think that those of us who see the utility of footnotes should have to suffer through reading works with end notes, that’s all.  Here are a couple of examples for you to make your own comparison.  First, look at the Grawemeyer winning book by Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace.  You’re not even done reading the first ten pages before you realize the depth of study that went into Volf’s writing.  You get comments, asides, and further discussion about the content that drives the thesis of the book.  It’s like you’re in a dialogue of sorts with the author.  The Climax of the Covenant, is a great example of the same kind of experience being created with footnotes from the work of Bishop Wright.  On the other hand, you get to works like Wright’s “Justification” or Volf’s “Free of Charge” (the book I am currently reading), and you have a completely different experience waiting for you.  There is no longer the comfort of knowing you can glance down and get bibliographic information  for a source, further insight from the author, or an explication of some complicated point.  No, No… now you have to devise some system for keeping your place in two locations of the book: your progress in the material and your progress in the notes must be maintained simultaneously.  I know what you might be thinking, “what a lazy bastard!”  And, ordinarily, I might agree with you if it wasn’t for the fact that this causes more than the inconvenience of having to have two bookmarks (which, incidentally, you’d think the publisher could provide for the premium price we’re paying for books these days).  It is about the fact that I am taken out of the rhythm of my reading to go looking for information that might as well be easily accessible at the bottom of the page.  Now, if the examples I cited were more popular works like Wright’s, “Surprised by Hope” that is intended for the consumption of laity, then I could understand the use of end notes (or no notes at all).

There are, then, at least three reasons I hate End Notes.  First, I like the feeling of “dialogue” that footnotes seem to create between me and the author.  Not unlike when the groundbreaking series Saved by the Bell used Zack Morris to break the “fourth wall” over and over again.  I feel like the barrier between me and the author is lessened when I get the notes (some of them amounting to nothing more than asides, which I like).  Second, I get into a rhythm reading.  It’s like a dance – the author leads my thinking around the virtual room of my mind, moving to the beat of the argument that is being unfolded.  When I have to stop to go read an end note, I feel like the band has quit playing in the middle of the song.  My mental interaction with the argument of the book is interrupted when I have to go fishing for a note.  Lastly, it’s just inconvenient.

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The following is an excerpt from an article I posted complete with footnotes (read said article here) about Christian Apologetic efforts and Islam, characterizing the demonizing tone that some Evangelicals take against Islam.

Problematically, some Christian polemicists have abandoned addressing these fundamental claims, and they have resorted to unhelpful tactics. By way of example, Richard Cimino argues that Evangelical Christians, in particular, have pushed rhetoric about Islam to a polemically fevered pitch as a kind of nationalistic, fear mongering response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. This ought to be received as a stinging criticism that is indicative of a willingness to focus on what are seen as devious practices within Islamic culture by Christians instead of making lucid arguments against their foundational claims.[14] According to Cimino, this is problematic because much of the positive, global-apologetic toward Muslims argued by polemicists like Ergun Caner centers on a characterization of Islam as dangerous, militant, and cultic.[15] However, this should all be tempered by Thomas Kidd’s research, which demonstrates plainly that such anti-Islamic polemics as Cimino describes were being leveled against Muslims by “Anglo-Americans” as early as 1697.[16]

So, while there is definitely an attempt to demonize the Islamic weltanschauung on the basis of mischaracterization, while there have been periods of interfaith dialogue initiated by Christians and spoiled by terrorists, and while there are clear examples of current Evangelical scholars focusing their apologetic efforts on ancillary issues within Islam, such behavior in no way belongs exclusively to the modern Evangelical movement. That particular characterization by Cimino is unwarranted. Nonetheless, Christian apologists should avoid being trapped by polemics preoccupied by what amount to “straw men” parading around as reductio ad absurdum arguments. There is sufficient dispute to be had with the foundational presuppositions of Islam to diminish the expediency of such distractions.

Richard Cimino, “‘No God in Common:’ American Evangelical Discourse on Islam after 9/11,” Review of Religious Research 47, no. 2 (December 2005): 162-74. Perhaps more immediately troublesome for students of Liberty Theological Seminary is the fact that Cimino singles out Ergun Caner’s Unveiling Islam as a polemic set out not only to demonize Islam, but also to “dispel the position of Geisler and Saleeb that Allah is the same God (Jehovah) that Christians and Jews worship.” See Cimino, “‘No God in Common,’” 166. Interestingly, Caner has included Geisler as a contributor in his Popular Encyclopedia of Apologetics. While Caner must certainly be given the berth to respectfully disagree with even those he includes in his edited works, all of the articles concerning Islam in the Popular Encyclopedia are authored by Caner. It may all prove coincidental, but such a situation only helps to strengthen Cimino’s critique.

Ibid.

Thomas S. Kidd, “‘Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?’ Early American Uses of Islam,” Church History 72, no. 4 (December 2003): 773.

Now, here is an excerpt from a Washington Post article (read the full article here), explaining that Liberty University has removed Ergun Caner from his position as Dean of the Seminary following an internal investigation, because he has lied about his history with and expertise on Islam.

The biography of Caner, 43, has become shrouded in doubt after apparent exaggerations were brought to light by an unusual alliance of Muslim and Christian bloggers. They have pored through his sermons, books, speeches and court documents, finding contradictions in his narrative. His expertise on Islam and his claim to having been raised as a radical Sunni Muslim in Turkey have been questioned.

Wednesday is Caner’s last day as dean; Liberty announced he was being removed because of “factual statements that are self-contradictory.” Although he will no longer be dean, Caner will continue as a professor. Critics say the school’s explanation falls short.

“They haven’t come clean and explained what exactly they investigated and found,” said James White, director of Alpha and Omega Ministries in Phoenix, who dug into Caner’s past. “One can only offer forgiveness if there’s repentance, and they’ve basically said nothing with their statement.”

Frankly, Caner is lucky they aren’t firing him.  How many stories about people who were fired for unscrupulous statements made on resumes are out there?  What is rule numero uno about filling out applications in this job market?  How many Evangelical universities are currently being taken to task over their questionable practices and faculty  choices?  Oh well, I guess the adage rings true once again, “There is no such thing as bad publicity.”

I would also like (humbly, of course) to point out that in spite of my burning desire to rake Caner over the coals, yours truly remained “above board” as my status as a Liberty student prevented me from doing so.  I made it part of my identity to dole out vigilante style justice on Caner’s brand of BS in the classroom a la the Boondock Saints during my other two degree programs.  Take a look at my CV and see which of my degrees I finished “with honors.”  :0)  So, time teaches wisdom – but,  I would still love to have a slew of posts to which I could direct your attention,  exposing Caner for all of this.  In the end, I guess I can just harumph around knowing that it is still a bigger deal to most people out there that 1) our Primate “is a chick” and 2) that God will condemn us for marrying and ordaining fags than it is that many prominent Evangelical leaders are falling off their pedestals in the most painfully ironic ways possible.

Harumph!

Tony Sig

Before a brief excersion in response to a friend, I was commenting on how seminaries should be purposeful about formation.  How we do and do not educate will – I cannot emphasize enough the will – shape the future of our fellowship.  There is no getting around it.  “Knowledge is Power,” Foucault said, and I couldn’t agree with him more.  Of course this has always been known and responsible teachers through the ages would have had no moral qualms about telling people how and even what to think, especially in early stages of learning.

Of late there has been a minor revival of so-called “classical education” largely in response to an essay written by the famous Dorothy Sayers entitled, “The Lost Tools of Learning.” I take this essay to be essentially correct and this (other) hyperbolic statement by Hauerwas properly frames where I am going with these next couple essays:

“As a way to challenge such a [liberal] view of freedom, I start my classes by telling my students that I do not teach in a manner that is meant to help them make up their own minds. Instead, I tell them that I do not believe they have minds worth making up until they have been trained by me. I realize such a statement is deeply offensive to students since it exhibits a complete lack of pedagogic sensitivities. Yet I cannot imagine any teacher who is serious who would allow students to make up their own minds.” —Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Schooling or Making Students Dysfunctional,” in Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), p. 220. HT: Faith and Theology

I’m preparing a very incomplete and theoretical curriculum for an entire seminary education that I hope to post in the next week or so.  For now let us consider a significant if not the most significant aspect of formation (I’m here speaking as an Anglican but most any “Rule of Prayer” in continuity within the liturgical and spiritual tradition of the Church could work); the Daily Office.  Any seminary worth its salt will pray, at the very least, the Morning and Evening Office.  I’ve always found the “noon” prayer in the ’79 BCP to be lackluster and unfocused but of course the Compline as well as the Service of Light are both spectacular.  It may not be of utter necessity that every student attend every single service, though I can’t imagine anything less than three weekday offices being at all adequate.  Whatever the case it ought to be performed daily.

Going a step beyond this I think it would be a stroke of brilliance to incorporate the material of the Office directly into the taught classes.  So hermeneutics, exegesis (same thing really) and Bible classes should teach from the Scripture readings each day.  Instead of a class on “Pauline Theology,” or “Pauline Letters” or “The Synoptics,” a seminary could have a “Bible” track that spans the whole of the education which covers the same material that such a class would have, but is done in a wholistic manner.

Many of the classes could be taught this way.  After learning the grammar, such a class could serve “double duty” as a “Greek Reading” class.  A teacher could take the NT passage and teach how to grammatically structure that passage.  Etc…to infinity.  It seems to me that the connection between the Office and the classes could be made in any number of creative ways.

One weakness is obviously the current Lectionary.  Anglican liturgical expert and spectacular blogger Derek Olsen says that the point of the Daily Office Lectionary, as compared to the Lectionary for use at the Mass, is to read and learn the Bible, not to be mystagogical.  There is of course a place for that but not here.  I still dig a two-year structure but it could stand to be more consistent in how it proceeds through books.  The entire OT and Deutero-canon every two years, NT about once a year, and the Psalms once a month or month and a half seems both substantial and doable.  The books should be read from beginning to end with no cutting out the non-liberal-protestant parts as it does now.

I am assuming that doing the dishes, cleaning the bathrooms and feeding the poor also fit into the general life of the Seminary but those are less “educational” in the same sense that I am talking about here.

A Word from George

February 24, 2010

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Here is some research I have been doing on one of my favorite biblical topics in light of my new found interest in Negative (Apophatic) Theology.  This is an abridged version of my research.  If you would like to read the full version complete with intro., conclusion, and back matter, you can read it here.

How the Gospel of John Has Been Read

            The number of theories circulating about how best to interpret John’s body of work is staggering.  Undoubtedly, this is due not only to the literature’s unique characteristics within the broader Scriptural corpus, but also due to the wealth of theologically sophisticated concepts contained therein.  While there is a clear indication that the Johannine literature evolved over time through redaction, form criticism does not account for the literary devices or the theological erudition; and neither literary nor textual criticism make proper account of John’s place in the larger Scriptural tradition.  However, many authors seem to agree that the continued fascination over the Johannine corpus is due in large part to either the inadequacy of the historical-critical method to interpret John faithfully or the inability of any other independent method to establish the theological and cultural nuance that seems to pervade the body of literature as a whole.  Consequently, recent scholarship has drawn into question whether there is a single “best” way to interpret John.

            Carson, in his commentary on the Gospel according to John, finds the locus of such characteristics in the interplay between John and the Synoptic Gospels, identifying several points of disagreement between John and the Synopitcs as John’s “independence.”  Specifically, Carson identifies those differences as John’s failure to include large quantities of material common to the Synoptics, John’s inclusion of large quantities of material not mentioned in the Synoptics, John’s thematic contradiction to themes well established in the Synoptics, John’s anachronistic account in relation to history and the Synoptics, and the evidence of John’s heavy use of editing as revealed in his use of Greek.  Bruce, in his work on Johannine literature, instead finds the independence of certain literary characteristics to be the most striking element that sets the Fourth Gospel apart from the Synoptics.  While Bruce, like Carson, employs a method much in line with other historical-critical efforts; he seems to be quite taken with John’s use of “character-portrayal” in particular, pointing out that the prominence of John’s use of dialogue has been a favorite of scholars in distinguishing the Fourth Gospel from the Synoptics.

            Dumm and Kanagaraj see not only the challenges of historical-cultural readings and the complexity of literary composition, but also how the more abstract elements of community and faith are expressed by John.  Dumm’s work is predicated on what he calls a gospel “which is so sensitive to the spiritual, symbolic dimension of biblical revelation.”  Kanagaraj traces the history of how prominent voices as early as Clement of Alexandria on through Augustine focused on those elements.  Both authors, however, also knowingly frame their arguments within an academic community that is obviously wary about labeling John as “mystical,” though it refuses to eliminate the possibility of such readings outside of the Gnostic context. 

            Burge opts to focus on the rich theological heritage of John’s Gospel, while making connections to how that heritage has been influenced by the form criticism and historical-cultural criticism that has shaped scholastic opinions of John’s corpus.  Burge does not neglect the discussion of textual issues within John or in comparison to the Synoptics, though it is clear that he prefers a literary method because it allows him the opportunity to focus on the theological contributions of John’s Gospel.  He identifies at least three major theological arcs in the Fourth Gospel: revelation and redemption, Jewish concerns, and Christian concerns.  Of particular interest, especially in light of the work done by Dumm and Kanagaraj, is the fact that Burge sees John’s view of history as reflecting the mystical presence of God in the sacraments.  Burge says, “John has a ‘sacramental’ view of history inasmuch as the incarnation of Christ for him means the genuine appearance of God in history.  Worship can affirm such genuine appearances when worship symbols (baptism, the Lord’s Supper) take on the real properties of that which they depict.”  This perspective becomes increasingly helpful when later considering the fact that both the theology of the incarnation of the Logos in John’s prologue is largely agreed upon, and that some postulate that the prologue to John’s Gospel constitutes early liturgical poetry.

            Köstenberger offers only a few disparaging comments about the inadequacy of historical-cultural studies in illuminating the text of John’s gospel, choosing instead to elaborate on the contributions of literary criticism in understanding the theological message of the Johannine literature.  Köstenberger sees John’s Gospel primarily as a Jewish theological treatise directed at a community of Jews after the fall of the Temple in 70 CE.  Consequently, he deviates from many scholars already mentioned here in dating the Gospel, and happens to categorize the major theological themes accordingly as God, the Christ, salvation, the Spirit, the new covenant community, and the last things.  There are, of course, myriad other approaches by scholars whose opinions are noteworthy; but only deviate from the methods already mentioned by degrees of variation, and happen to be iterations of older scholarship.

            It will be helpful, then, to place the current positions held by these authors in their place among the history of Johannine interpretation, especially that of the early church. The focus is on the early church, because much of the scholarship emanating from the middle church is easily categorized.  Carson states, “Whether the Fourth Gospel was interpreted so as to ground some form of Christian mysticism, or so as to make clear the truth of justification by faith, there was at least no doubt that it was the product of the Apostle John, that in some ways it is the most focused of the four canonical Gospels, and that fundamental reconciliation between John and the Synoptics can be achieved.”  As such, the mystical tradition of the middle church played an important role in making possible the kind of Apophatic rendering that may now be useful in understanding the full scope of John’s use of Logos as a Christological title.  However, these mystical theories neither find their origin nor their most lucid articulation in the middle church.

            The Fourth Gospel was ubiquitously held in the highest esteem in the early church.  Though, this is a point that Bruce seems to make in passing and that Carson will not deign to make, choosing instead to focus on the canonical veracity of its claims to apostolic authority through the testimony of the early church.  It is an approach, no doubt, that falls in line with the decidedly historical-critical method employed by both Bruce and Carson.  Curiously, though, both expound upon the early church’s refutation of Gnosticism without mentioning how Irenaeus soundly rejected the basis of Gnostic claims without rejecting the spiritual nature of the Gospel or its primacy over the Synoptics.  Irenaeus, though, is a good example of how John was heralded generally by the end of the second century, and how the apologists revered him specifically.  In fact, as early as Clement of Alexandria and Irenaeus, we see John’s Gospel being used not only as an apologetic for the incarnation but also as an interpretive lens for the Hebrew Scriptures, for which the prologue to the Gospel was the linchpin.  It is worth mentioning, though, that many of these authors acknowledge that it was common for prominent theologians of the early church to view John’s Gospel as having a “spiritual” component even if they do no validate such a reading themselves.

            Consequently, it bears repeating that the current state of Johannine studies is one of incorporation.  Every author certainly entertains a preference for one critical method over the other, but there is little deviation from the opinion that individual methodologies have outlived their usefulness as frameworks that are singularly capable of expressing the intent and message of the biblical authors.  There even exists a tolerance for those methodologies that see in the Johannine corpus a mystical element, though not articulated in the trappings of mystical expression per se.  Therefore, while historical-critical, literary, and textual methods still have an important role to play in our reading of the Johannine literature, there is an important contribution to be made by negative theology as well.

Placing the Prologue of John’s Gospel Through John’s Use of Logos

            The prologue of John’s Gospel is not only the conceptual summary of John’s account, but also the lens through which the Evangelist wants readers to view Jesus.  Burge calls it an “overture to the story of the rest of the Gospel.”  Because of the summary or preview nature of the prologue and the “preliminary narrative sections that have been dovetailed into it,” there is assent concerning the theory that the prologue to John’s Gospel was penned after the Gospel proper; and the notion that the original narrative probably began at verse nineteen finds similar corroboration.  Burge elsewhere identifies the prologue as one of the prominent “literary seams” or “aporias” of John’s Gospel, in which there is a clear distinction between the poetic structure and idiomatic language of the prologue and the rest of the Gospel. This view has been commonly accepted on the basis of two types of arguments: those based on form or textual criticism and those based on theological analysis.  Most often, though, the view is held in light of some combination of the two, except where the author feels sufficient doubt to label such attempts as “speculative at best.”

            An argument offered by Ed L. Miller regarding the origin of the Logos and, here, the structure and dating of the prologue to John’s Gospel in relationship to the rest of the Johannine literature proves to be of some import.  His essential claim is that both the literary and theological reasons for believing the prologue was written after the Gospel provide sufficient justification for looking first to the Johannine literature for an explanation of the Logos.  Like Burge, Miller sees the prologue’s mention of John the Baptist (1:6-8, 15) and some personal commentary (1:13, 17-18) as interruptions to a “hymn” consisting of several strophes.  Two points should be kept in mind: first, Miller is utterly convinced that the prologue is a completely distinct literary construction, though penned by the same author as the rest of the Johannine literature, and second, the appropriate chronology for the writing of the prologue is to place it after the creation of John’s first epistle; so that John first wrote the Gospel proper, then wrote 1 John, and ended by writing the prologue and attaching it to the beginning of the Gospel.  This reading that suggests that the Christological title offered in the first lines of the prologue is actually the end of a “Christological development.”

            Miller essentially bases this thesis on John’s literary style.  First, Miller points out both the frequency and the manner with which John uses Christological terminology.  According to Miller, the terms logos and rhema are used with such frequency that, “we must, then, be struck at once by this writer’s penchant for the word ‘word.’”  Miller also argues, though, that “it is not just a matter of the frequency with which ‘word’ or ‘words’ occurs in this Gospel but, more important, the manner in which they occur.  Not only are they concentrated at the center of the Johannine picture of Jesus; they function with an immediate significance for that picture.” 

            This, of course, finds corroboration with other scholars writing on John’s penchant for both literary variation and Christological imagery.  More than a denotative deconstruction and mechanical analysis, John wants to produce a connotative web of ideas that would come to mind at the mention of any one of many key terms.  Bruce elucidates the principle as it is at work in John’s use of antithesis, “Our Evangelist delights to use contrasting terms; good and evil, love and hatred, life and death, salvation and judgment, light and darkness, truth and falsehood.  The positive terms in these antithetical pairs are largely interchangeable – good, love, life, salvation, light, truth.”  Miller’s proposition is that ‘word’ be added to this list of interchangeable terms in John as also having “Christological transparency,” demonstrating that the “word” in all of its cognates pervades John’s Gospel.  Miller asks some rather poignant questions in defense of his point:

            Aside from the relatively few instances in which these terms bear an ordinary and limited meaning, do they not otherwise strive to point beyond themselves to a “Word?”  Do they not seem to be a sort of splashover from the pervasive theme of the Gospel, the divine revelation in Christ?  Do they not seem at every turn, on every page, in a variety of ways,       to point the reader to the saving truth that is in and is Christ?

Therefore, Miller’s argument seems self-perpetuating.  He believes that the prologue represents the most recent edition out of the Gospel, first epistle, and prologue, because the language of the prologue demonstrates the mature or evolved sense of Logos.  Consequently, the origin of the Logos as a Christological title is found within the Johannine corpus, and not necessarily some extant tradition as evidenced by John’s penchant for the “word” as a theological concept.

            Aside from Miller’s theory, there have been at least four common explanations for the origin and meaning of logos in the prologue of John’s Gospel, and each of them looks outside of the Johannine literature for a source from which John presumably borrowed.  First, the Old Testament use of the word dābār, “which represents the word of God as eternal, creative, sustaining, healing, redemptive, prophetic, etc., and as increasingly hypostatized and personified as it passed as the Greek logos, into the wisdom literature.”  Second, is the later Jewish construct for wisdom, Sophia that serves as a personification of the “first of God’s creations and the attendant craftsman in all subsequent creation.”  Third, some see the logos of Greek philosophy of Heraclitus, Epicharmus, and the Stoics, “which employed logos to mean the divine Reason which pervades and controls all things in such a way as to produce beauty, harmony, an unity of the whole.”  Finally, scholars also point to Gnostic sources that saw the Word as an emissary between the physical and metaphysical realms, though these claims are dismissed nearly out of hand.

            Consequently, if the prologue of John’s Gospel constitutes the “end” of John’s Christological development, then the placement of the prologue’s authorship on the Johannine timeline limits the scope of influences on the use of Logos.  More importantly, the place of the prologue within the Johannine literature contextualizes the development of John’s Christology within the Christian community and serves to further demonstrate the unique nature of John’s Gospel among the Synoptics.  Indeed, Miller concedes this in his conclusion, “the Johannine origin of Logos, the Johannine christological title par excellence, underscores the relative independence and originality of this Gospel.”

The Appropriate Utilization and Value of an Apophatic Reading

            John’s Logos serves as a sophisticated theological concept that has long been understood within both incarnational and spiritual contexts.  However, given the rather subjective history of attributing source material and subsequent meaning to John’s use of the term Logos in the prologue, three things should be reiterated in making the case for what will prove to be not only a traditional rendering of the Christological title, but also one that seems to have fallen out of favor with modern scholars.  First, the disquietude felt over allowing one interpretive framework to dictate the shape of Johannine literature is justified.  Just as many scholars have pointed to the fact that John planned his Gospel to be an independent voice proclaiming the anointed role and divine nature of Christ, the Johannine literature has defied clean taxonomical organization.  It is important, then, that the history of Johannine interpretation have a large say in the future of Johannine interpretation, and the utility that the Christian community has always played in that interpretation ought to be sought out again. 

            Second, John’s sacramental view of history ought to be kept in tension with modern understandings of his vision concerning why the Logos came.  There is ample scholarship to demonstrate that the incarnational tone of the prologue echoes John’s broader sacramental notions of Christ’s presence in the midst of the darkness as the light.  There seems to be thematic and theological harmony in the fact that many of the scholars under present discussion have ratified the notion that the prologue to John’s Gospel may have functioned as an early liturgical hymn.  There can be little doubt that John’s sacramental theology and an appropriate understanding of the Logos becoming flesh are intimately linked.

            Third, there can also be little doubt that some scholars, though erudite and in possession of proven records, have come into a place of dogmatism concerning not only critical methodology but also theologically viable understandings of the Johannine corpus.  Miller’s entire article has an undertone of facetious shock at how novel it might be to actually see John’s own work as the source of the theological force behind the Logos.  This kind of stale environment surrounding what has become the dogmatism of critical scholarship, even as it is adapted by more conservative Protestant scholars, warrants the exploration of another option.  In fact, these are precisely the conditions under which negative theology has historically driven the spiritually efficacious orthopraxy of previous generations.

            Negative or Apophatic Theology has not only been historically relevant, but can also be traced back to explicit biblical foundations according to Paul Rorem who explains,

“My thoughts are not your thoughts,” says Isaiah’s Lord (Isa 55:9).  The divine is invisible, ineffable, incomprehensible; these are all negations stemming from recognition of divine transcendence.  Early authors such as Justin, Ireneaus, Clement, and Origen of Alexandria built their theologies on these foundations.  God by definition   transcends our words, concepts, and capacities, such that all affirmations must be qualified and only negations are entirely true.

Many of these historical figures, incidentally, have also proven instrumental in demonstrating the canonical authority, historical veracity, and theological profundity of the Johannine corpus.  Kenney explains that our representation of reality develops into a dimensionless theory because, “we lose sight of the divine whenever we accept as final or complete any conceptual representation of it.  The true object of religious devotion and theological attention is not contained in the formulas of its representation, however authoritative or conceptually exact; rather it exceeds all finite capacity for conceptual similitude.”  Consequently, there has been a long struggle to understand the intent of John in some complete conceptual representation since historical-critical methods gained their popularity, but there may be negative elements endemic to the prologue of John’s Gospel that are more helpful.

            First, it is important to note that both Rorem and Kenney are quite clear about the fact that Negative (Apophatic) Theology remains irrevocably tied to affirmations, especially those inherent in Scripture, because there must first be something to negate.  While Apophatic Theology is appropriately associated with mystic traditions and a pursuit of the divine presence, its means are not directed to the result of “mystical experience as such, but the combination of a firmly critical sensibility, recalcitrant to all theological dogmatism, with a strengthened awareness of divine presence.”  It is in this sense that an Apophatic rendering of the Logos is warranted.  In light of the fact that the prologue of John has historically been experienced within the pursuit of the divine presence through the incarnation, we can see the valuable application of an Apophatic perspective.

            Second, it is important also to note that Apophatic Theology does not usurp or supplant theological orthodoxy.  Such has been the fear surrounding not only the general mention of mystical elements within theology, but also specific mystic claims about the Johannine literature.  Not only is there room for orthodoxy, even dogmatism, within Apophatic theology, but the “efficacy of negative theology is proportional to the strength of the theological assertions that it serves to deny.”  However, demonstrating concern that a thing does not exceed its appropriate influence and ignoring it all together are different propositions; and certainly using the former as justification of the latter feels intellectually dishonest at the least.  As Kenney concludes, he explains that the relative success of any Apophatic theology will vary within religious traditions and their respective schools of thought in orthodoxy; but the situation “suggests a distinction between two sorts of orthodoxy: ‘authoritarian dogmatism’ which demands obeisance to formulas and those who authorize them, and ‘definitional dogmatism,’ which seeks to set down and clarify beliefs.”

            There remains to be seen how an Apophatic Theology can adequately and accurately inform an understanding of the Christological title, Logos, as it is utilized in the prologue to John’s Gospel.  As Rorem and Kenney have suggested, such an Apophasis would rely heavily on the kind of robust kataphatic orthodoxy that has been here explicated.  Consequently, Rorem offers the Incarnational Apophatic of Maximus the Confessor, who understands the Logos from the negation that concludes the text of the prologue: “No one has ever seen God, but God the One and Only, who is at the Father’s side, has made him known” (John 1:18).  Maximus explains:

The knowledge of [God the Word] himself in his essence and personhood remains inaccessible to all angels and men alike and he can in no way be known by anyone.  But St. John, initiated as perfectly as humanly possible into the meaning of the Word’s incarnation, claims that he has seen the glory of the Word as flesh, that is, he saw the   reason or the plan for which God became man, full of grace and truth.  For it was not as    God by essence, consubstantial to God the Father, that the only-begotten Son gave this grace, but as having in the incarnation become man by nature, and consubstantial to us, that he bestows grace on us who have need of it.

So, it is in John’s own terms that we find that Negation leads the reader to the incarnate Christ.  Rorem explains, “For Maximus, the Apophatic recognition of God’s transcendence does not lead to endless progress as it does for Gregory, or directly to union with the unknown God as it does for Dionysius, but rather to Christ as the incarnate revelation of God.”

            Surely, though the previous negation of the prologue does not now escape our attention.  The initial negation is linked to an even clearer indication that the Logos in John’s Gospel not only finds its origin in the Johannine corpus as Miller suggests, but also points to the mystery of the identity of the transcendent that has become tangible.  John writes, “Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made” (John 1:3).  Clearly, if the negation of the eighteenth verse demonstrates the incarnate Christ, then the negation of the third verse demonstrates the pre-existent Logos.

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Portrait_of_Martin_Luther_as_an_Augustinian_Monk

Luther and Predestinarianism in the Reformation

            The similarities between Augustine and Luther extend beyond Luther’s experience as a monk of the Augustinian order, which seems a forgone conclusion at first.  Clearly, Augustine heavily influences Luther regarding presuppositions that underpin their predestinarianism.  Bayer contends that Luther’s interpretation of Scripture leads him to the same conclusions about human nature as Augustine: the nature of sin in man is both, “superbia and desperatio.”[1]  However, Luther has more in common with Augustine than just a hermeneutical predisposition.  Augustine affected Luther’s thinking so significantly because of a shared soteriological need.  Luther offered more than intellectual obeisance to Augustine; he needed Augustine to lead him down a philosophical path that would clear his conscience.

            Luther’s life was plagued with the same kind of religious upheaval that Augustine experienced.  An important difference, though, is that Luther seemed to be cognizant of an internal upheaval that drove his various religious experiences.  Augustine sought explanation for his seeming reluctance to seek Christ wholeheartedly, but Luther was so consumed by a pursuit of piety that he could not easily find solace.  Luther’s early life lacked the wholehearted embrace of sinfulness that plagued Augustine, but his angst over the origin, nature, and effect of sin were strikingly similar.  As a monk, Luther sought consolation in works of grace hoping for absolution and justification.  However, even a strict regimen of sacramental observance and contrition left him with the dread of damnation.  Luther became so obsessed with absolution that he pathologically pondered his sin and found that confession only intensified his guilt.  After a foray into mysticism, Luther abandoned his strict sacramental pursuit for an endeavor in loving God.  Sadly, his childhood experience with severe authority figures left him hating God instead.[2]

            At the behest of his confessor, Luther entered into a lectureship at the University of Wittenberg.  His superior hoped, as in the case of Jerome, that Luther would find his temptations and guilt abated in the study of Scripture.  This appointment now seems providential.  While preparing a lecture in the Epistle to the Romans, Luther concluded that both faith and justification are the work of God, alone.[3]  This revelation about the nature of grace and its correspondence to both faith and justification were the balm that Luther required.  Augustine’s work on predestination in relationship to Romans provided the fine-tuning that Luther needed.  This predestinarianism, then, became for Luther what it had been for Augustine, a means of confidently receiving grace.  Luther was lead to affirm predestination both because, “it was a corollary of justification by faith as a free gift of God, and because he found it amply supported by the authority of Paul and Augustine.”[4]  However, this doctrine also provided a point of attack for the increasingly Pelagian Catholic Church.

            Just as Augustine found cause to sharpen his predestinarianism in Pelagius, Luther found cause to refine his position because of Desiderius Erasmus.  Luther and Erasmus, who had averted being involved in the conflict with reformers to this point, engaged in a published dispute over the ability of humanity to cooperate with God in achieving salvation.  Erasmus’ view that the human will is capable of fighting “against the flesh or for the Spirit,”[5] was rejected wholly by Luther.  He countered with arguments, which reasoned, “Man can contribute nothing toward his own salvation good enough to be juxtaposed with any work of God.”[6]  Interestingly, Luther sided with the most revered scholars of the Catholic Church, Augustine and Aquinas among them, against Erasmus and the church.  Luther’s defense of Augustinian predestinarianism would not be emulated by the rest of the Protestant church, though.  The other Reformers took the example of Luther and the work of Augustine a step further.

The Reformation’s Departure from Augustinian and Lutheran Predestinarianism

            The various incarnations of Augustine and Luther’s soteriological doctrine eventually yielded to a theological system that expunged human cooperation in faith and broadened the doctrine’s scope to the entirety of God’s providential rule over creation.  Certainly, many agreed with Luther and sought to expand his influence and teaching.  Many hoped, though, to expound upon or deviate from the teaching of Luther.  In fact, Luther found his ideals and doctrine caught between the Catholic Church and the likes of Carlstadt and Calvin.[7] 

            Nevertheless, the remaining important issue revolves around Luther’s resolve in pursuing Augustinian predestinarianism, though not likely out of any inordinate dedication to Augustine himself.  Nonetheless, McGrath observes that, “Of the reformers, it is Martin Luther who is closest to Augustine in his teaching on justification.”[8]  He remains the closest to Augustine because he did not attempt to derive a theological system out of his notions of predestination.  While Luther spoke plainly of ecclesiastical and priestly behavior he found contradictory to Scripture, he did seek to know the word of God truly, even if it meant agreeing with the church.  Melanchthon viewed Luther within the Reformation context as a voice “interchangeable” with Augustine: a voice that was renewing the early teachings of the church.[9]  In fact, according to McGrath, “Augustine’s conflict with Pelagianism in particular is seen by Melanchthon as an exemplar of the Lutheran protest against the Pelagianism of the sixteenth-century church.”[10]

            Wallace provides helpful categorization of the change that occurs after Luther in the Reformation:

     “A more significant division between doctrines of predestination is not whether it is single or double, but between those versions where its soteriological impact remains central and those where the doctrine becomes an organizing principle for a theological system and is thus intertwined with the whole consideration of providence, something which became increasingly the case in the later part of the sixteenth century.”[11]

This kind of predestinarianism seems present in Augustine and Luther.  However, historians and theologians alike have long commented on the polarizing, often inflammatory, nature of both Augustine’s and Luther’s polemical treatises.  Wallace notes that while there is a strong predestinarianism in Luther’s reply to Erasmus in the Bondage of the Will, a marked emphasis on double predestination does not occur in the English Reformation until it is formulated by the Swiss and Rhineland Reformed traditions.[12]  These reformed traditions inherited their emphasis on double predestination from the likes of John Calvin.

            It would be a mischaracterization to promulgate a claim that Calvin merely expanded the scope of Augustine’s theories.  McGrath notes that Calvin, in his Institutes, does not wholly approve of Augustine’s treatment and departs from Augustine’s belief that “Christ is the source of man’s righteousness, in that the Spirit is poured into man’s heart on account of his obedience.”[13]  Calvin insists that the transformative work of faith and grace are completely alien to the human nature.  God is sovereign over all of creation and its redemption, and humanity is utterly depraved.  Calvin’s departure from Augustine and Luther occurs most notably in the creation of a theological system that locates double predestination as one of its pillars of thought. 

            This shift in theology has been rejected by church councils for over a thousand years.  It demands that all of Scripture bow to its methodology.  Geisler points out that the consequences of this system burden humanity with a God that is the direct author of evil and that hates the non-elect.[14]  As one who worked tirelessly and meticulously to avoid those very consequences in his own theology, this outcome would have been completely unacceptable to Augustine

            However, it also suffers from crippling philosophical contradictions, and it should suffice to note that Augustine’s predestinarianism has been relegated to an element of theology until the emergence of lapsarianism.  This system of decrees and there seeming authority, even over the biblical text, create a web of presuppositions that rest squarely on Augustine’s philosophy of the origin of evil.  Robert Brown identifies the philosophical problems associated with using Augustine’s predestinarianism as a foundational system of thought, explaining that Augustine’s explanation of first sin is at best incomprehensible.[15]  If it becomes something more than incomprehensible, then the system’s other claims regarding God’s nature or his culpability in creating evil is suspect at best.  Geisler has already hinted at this in his theological critique of double predestination, but this is clearly his point of reference for making the claim.

Conclusion

            While predestination is an unavoidably biblical concept, Augustine and Luther intended to direct the hearts of men toward God in gratitude for grace received, not to establish a lens through which all other Scripture must pass.  Predestination achieved, for Augustine and Luther, a different end than what is achieved by a system based on double predestination.  Augustinian and Lutheran predestinarianism provides a soteriological framework to understand how humanity, in its plight, is able to receive and be confident in justification.  This predestination declares the God is the author and finisher of our faith, and that there is no person or thing that can separate us from that work.

 


[1] Oswald Bayer, “Freedom?  The Anthropological in Luther and Melanchthon Compared.” The Harvard Theological Review, 91 (October 1998): 375.

[2] González, The Story of Christianity, Vol. 2, 16-17.

[3] Ibid., 19-20.

[4] Ibid., 42.

[5] Oswald Bayer, “Freedom,” 377.

[6] Roland N. Bainton, Christianity, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000): 253.

[7] Though for very different reasons.  Ibid.

[8] Alister E. McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation? A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification.” The Harvard Theological Review, 75 (April 1982): 230.

[9] Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon, (Geneva: Droz, 1961) 32.

[10] Alister E. McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation,” 229.

[11] Wallace, Dewey D. “The Doctrine of Predestination in the Early English Reformation.” Church History, 43 (June 1974): 203-204.

[12] Ibid., 202.

[13] Alister E. McGrath, “Forerunners of the Reformation,” 233.

[14] Geisler, Systematic Theology, 567.

[15] A term Brown utilizes as an expression of a temporal happenstance with a transcendent cause.  The sin of Satan and Adam may have happened temporally, but its cause is outside of our closed finite system.  Brown argues that any other explanation of Augustine’s postulations results in grievous philosophical error.  I contend that Brown is reading Augustine through the lens of Calvin and a theological system.  If Augustine can be read concerning the origin and effect of a sinful will in relation to humanity’s ability to save itself, then Augustine has accomplished what Brown had hoped he would, a structure for interpreting one’s present existence (324).  See Robert F. Brown, “The First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible: A Critique of Augustine.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 46 (September 1978): 315-329.

Tony Sig

-  The fact is that there are many versions of inerrancy.  What it means for one will not necessarily hold for all.  For some it includes all historical realities all (apparent) contradictions, for some it means only in matters of faith.  This reality alone should alert us that even IF inerrancy were a true proposition concerning the nature of Scripture, it remains that the content of such a proposition is either pluriform or meaningless.  I vote the latter.

-  If Infallibility means that “Scripture will not fail to fulfill its purpose” and if it’s purpose is to elucidate the nature and plans of God, then it most certainly fails all the time.  There are countless skeptics and non-believers who can and do read the Scriptures and who are not illuminated as to the nature and plans of God.  Moreover, even believers will sometimes read it wrongly (according to the pattern of the Church) and believe all sorts of silly stuff.

But, some might say, that is the problem of the subjectivity of the interpreter.  That seems to me to miss the point.  We have no reason to believe that God wanted to pour himself into a text for the sake of having an infallible text, that is, if the problem is in the subjectivity of the reader and not the objectivity of the text, then we are in effect saying God’s intention for the creating Scripture is an end in itself.  The point of Revelation (and Creation for that matter!) is relationship.  God desires not so much to convey intellectual truths about himself as he does to extend his love and fellowship.  Is it necessary, or anywhere described, that in order to bring mankind into fellowship it is necessary for Scripture to be infallible?

-  It does not follow logically that Scripture must posses the same features as God.  For example in the propositional argument:

God does not error – the Bible is God’s word – therefore it has no errors.

Only God posseses God’s characteristics in their wholeness.

-  Which brings us back to “The Word of God” – Within Scripture it is used in many ways, only some of which relate to the words of Scripture themselves.

  • They are most often in the OT used to refer to prophetic words.  It should be noted, as I did before, that it these prophetic proclamations that are properly so called the “Word of the Lord.”  The elaboration, redaction and collection cannot call itself the Word of the Lord in the same fashion.  Not that I’m trying with a scalpel to set up artificial “hierarchies” of “Word,” I’m trying to flesh the distinctive facets of Scripture.
  • In the NT, as far as I can tell, it is used exclusively of the Gospel proclamation of the life, death and resurrection of Christ.
  • Which brings us to Jesus.  If we want to say that there is a self-communication of God that shares the traits of God intrinsically we need to look to the 2nd person of the Holy Trinity.  When asking about the Father, Jesus told his disciples, “If you have seen me, you have seen the Father.”  He didn’t say that there was an infallible grouping of holy writings they should check out.  Indeed, the risen Lord elucidated the Scriptures in reference to himself and founds a community of forgiven around himself.

-  On Tradition – It is always risky to speak monolithically of the Fathers, but I took some time and found that the Fathers I read were concerned with the unity of the Scriptures over and against Marcionites, Gnostics and others who were attempting to set Jesus and his Father against the God of the OT, or turn Jesus into a demi-urge, etc…

In point of fact, what we think of as conservative evangelical inerrancy is indeed a very late and highly dogmatic and, dare I say, un-Christocentric turn.  It is largely a reaction to critical scholarship and is problematically modernist and foundationalist.

A look at perhaps the most famous Statement on Inerrancy, the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy demonstrates clearly what I have been saying now for some years.  I quote:

The authority of Scripture is inescapably impaired if this total divine inerrancy is in any way limited or disregarded, or made relative to a view of truth contrary to the Bible’s own; and such lapses bring serious loss to both the individual and the Church.

Inerrancy functions as a dogma in order to guarantee the authority of Scripture in the community, but it in no way says anything instrinsically essential about its nature.

-  If the doctrine functions to ensure authority and not truth, then it would be fair to ask if any post-modern might rightfully see this as a hidden discourse of power.

-  If inerrancy only pertains to the original documents and we posses none of these, then is it not possible that the texts we have do contain errors?  Indeed what text do we have when we have a text in our possession?  Even the exact text among printed Greek and Hebrew bibles differs even if only in minor and inconsequential ways.  So then might not even a strict inerrantist affirm errors in the Bible as we have it?

Please.  Have mercy on me readers.  Perhaps I should mention once again my affirmation of the inspiration of Holy Scriptures, of their trustworthiness read in the believing community and of the ability of God to reveal himself in Holy Scriptures.  And I like long walks on the beach.

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